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This study documents four key facts about informal economic activities: (1) the size of 
the informal sector varies greatly across nations; (2) this size is strongly correlated with 
economic development, the tax burden, and the rule of law; (3) the informal sector 
emphasizes small-scale, self-financed and unskilled labour intensive economic 
activities; and (4), while financial markets are generally segmented along 
formal/informal lines in developing nations there is no compelling evidence that this is 
true for labour markets. We review the existing theoretical literature on the informal 
sector and describe a simple model with a tradeoff between tax evasion and access to 
formal sources of outside finance which is consistent with much of the existing 
evidence. Finally, the study discusses the challenges associated with measuring informal 
sector assets. 
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1 Introduction 
A distinguishing feature of developing economies is the importance of untaxed, 
unregulated activities. According to existing estimates, it is not unusual for the informal 
sector to account for over half of GDP and employment in low-income nations. The 
prevalence of informal activities in these nations is a natural response to burdensome 
regulatory and tax environments. However, it comes at a cost. Small tax bases constrain 
fiscal authorities to raise revenues through inefficient means and to delay necessary 
investments in infrastructure and education. Furthermore, resources are not likely to be 
directed to their most efficient uses if production is carried out in an environment where 
formal mechanisms of contract enforcement and dispute resolution are not available. 
Governments in developing nations resort to a variety of policies to try and bring more 
economic units into the tax-paying fold. These range from sporadic crackdowns on 
undeclared economic activities, to subsidies and tax breaks for firms that agree to 
register legally and maintain legitimate tax accounting practices. Understanding the 
intended and unintended effects of these policies (and their often limited success) is an 
important area of research. This requires models that are consistent with the existing 
evidence on the nature and determinants of informal economic activities. 
 
Our first objective in this study is to document a set of robust empirical regularities with 
which a satisfactory model of the informal sector should be consistent. These 
regularities include a strong correlation between institutional quality, the tax burden and 
the size of the informal sector, even among nations at similar stages of economic 
development. They also include marked differences in the distribution of employee and 
employer characteristics across sectors. Specifically, the informal sector emphasizes 
self-financed, under-capitalized, small-scale, unskilled-labour intensive production.  
 
An empirical issue over which there is much less consensus is whether or not labour 
markets are segmented along formal/informal lines in developing nations. While all 
evidence indicates that, on average, formal wages are higher than informal wages, this 
average earnings differential could simply reflect the fact that formal workers tend to be 
more educated and more experienced than their informally employed counterparts. 
Although many papers argue that a formal sector premium remains after controlling for 
observable employer and employee characteristics, it is well-known that standard 
segmentation tests are weak and produce results that are sensitive to the choice of 
econometric techniques.1 Overall, Maloney (1999) concludes that compelling evidence 
that labour markets are dualistic in developing countries has yet to be produced. We 
point out in this chapter that the debate over segmentation has important implications 
for the evaluation of pro-development policies. Our view is that until the debate is 
resolved, the policy implications of models based on the assumption that labour markets 
                                                 
1 See Heckman and Hotz (1986).   2
are segmented should be interpreted with caution and compared to the prescriptions that 
emanate from competitive models.  
 
Our second objective is to evaluate the extent to which current models of the informal 
sector are consistent with the existing empirical evidence. Early work on the informal 
sector emphasized barriers to entry into the formal sector for workers as the explanation 
for the existence of large informal sectors in many low-income countries. In contrast, in 
the recent literature, large informal sectors arise as the optimal response to burdensome 
institutional environments. In those models, direct subsidies to formal employment are 
poor substitutes for improvements in institutional quality. We describe a static model 
that contains the key ingredients of most modern models of the informal sector and 
show that it provides potential explanations for much of what we know about the 
informal sector. Furthermore, because recent work adopts a general equilibrium 
approach, it is possible to analyze the effects of various public policies on welfare, 
output and productivity. 
 
Our final objective is to discuss the difficulties associated with measuring informal 
sector wealth. The empirical evidence suggests that a large fraction of capital formation 
takes place in the informal sector. By their very nature, informal assets are difficult to 
inventory. Given the difficulties inherent to recording hidden economic activities, the 
large size of informal sectors in many nations makes measures of wealth inequality 
across households and across countries unreliable. The only solution lies in the 
continued improvement of national accounting practices worldwide. These 
measurement issues have important consequences for policy. As de Soto (2000) 
explains, formal and informal assets are not comparable. Because informal assets 
seldom carry proper titles, they cannot be used as collateral for formal loans which 
implies that many profitable investment opportunities, hence opportunities to build 
wealth, are left untapped in the informal sector. These observations lead de Soto to 
conclude that formalizing property rights is the key to giving the poor better access to 
credit. This view is controversial2 but it is clear that properly accounting for informal 
wealth will help improve the design of development policies. 
 
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the evidence on the size and 
determinants of the informal sector and the characteristics of formal and informal 
production. In section 3 we discuss theories of informal sector activities and the extent 
to which they are consistent with the empirical characteristics of informal activity. The 
fourth section sketches a model of informal and formal activity that is consistent with 
the existing evidence. We discuss the challenges associated with measuring informal 
sector assets in section 5, and section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                 
2 See Woodruff (2001) for a discussion.   3
2 The  facts 
This section provides a survey of the existing evidence on the importance, the 
characteristics and the determinants of informal economic activities. As we shall see, 
empirical studies in this area tend to employ very different methodologies, in part 
because they rely on different practical definitions of informal activities. Despite these 
methodological differences, the empirical literature has unearthed a number of robust 
characteristics of informal sector production.  
2.1 Definitions  of  informal activities 
In the context of its World Employment Programme, the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) sponsored several surveys of labour markets in developing nations 
in the early 1970s. The findings of these surveys, particularly those associated with the 
Kenya mission in 1972 (see ILO 1972), stress the importance of unregulated, informal 
economic activities. The ILO elected to define the informal sector as enterprises with all 
or most characteristics in a list that includes ‘family ownership ... small scale of 
operations ... labour-intensive methods...’. 
 
Weeks (1975) chooses instead to define formal firms as firms that are ‘...recognized, 
nurtured and regulated by the state’. Hart (1973) defines the formal sector as wage 
earners as opposed to self-employed workers. Mazumdar (1975) takes a similar 
approach but bases his distinction between informal and formal workers on whether or 
not they receive protection from the government and/or trade unions. This definition 
illustrates the dualistic (or segmented) view of labour markets in developing nations that 
originated with Lewis (1954). According to this view, the ‘wage-level and working 
conditions in the [formal] sector are not available, in general, to the job seekers in the 
market unless they manage to cross the barrier of entry somehow’ (Mazumdar 1975). 
 
These early definitions of informality were quickly criticized for being ambiguous 
(Sethuraman 1981) or simplistic (Bromley 1978). Recognizing the difficulty of 
providing a strict, universal definition of informality, Castells et al. (1989) offer the 
following context-specific definition: informal activities are a ‘process of income-
generation’ that is ‘unregulated by the institutions of society, in a legal and social 
environment in which similar activities are regulated’. The formal sector, in this broad 
sense, includes all production establishments that fail to comply with government 
regulations such as taxes and the labour code and all workers who fail to receive 
government-mandated benefits or are paid below the minimum wage. Many recent 
investigations of the informal sector rely on practical implementations of this view that 
reflect the constraints imposed by data availability. 
2.2 Measurement  issues 
Given the nature of informal activities, measuring the size of the informal sector is a 
difficult task. A variety of methods have been used to construct estimates. This section   4
reviews some of the commonly used methods. It draws heavily on Schneider and Enste 
(2000) and the references contained therein.   
 
Direct approaches to measuring the size of the informal sector rely on survey data. For 
instance, standard household surveys provide a good estimate of the fraction of workers 
who fail to receive the benefits which labour law mandates in a given nation (see e.g. 
Pratap and Quintin 2006). Some surveys directly question households about their 
activities, both declared and undeclared. Clearly, the quality of the resulting estimates 
depends crucially on the reliability of responses. Data from fiscal audits can also 
provide estimates of the magnitude of undeclared income in a given nation, after 
correcting for the fact that taxpayers selected for audit are a biased sample.  
 
An alternative approach is to estimate the size of the informal sector indirectly using 
macroeconomic variables. One estimate of the importance of undeclared activities is the 
gap between GDP measured according the income approach and GDP measured 
according to the expenditure approach. A second approach (known as the currency-
demand method) attributes the fraction of currency demand which is not explained by a 
standard money demand equation to the informal sector.3 A third indirect approach uses 
electricity consumption data to obtain an estimate of total economic activity, from 
which one can subtract official measures of economic activity to produce an estimate of 
unofficial activity. This method is often referred to as the physical input method. In 
addition to assuming that the ratio of electricity use to economic activity is relatively 
stable, this approach requires reliable electricity consumption data. Finally, the model 
approach (often called the Multiple Indicator, Multiple Cause or MIMIC model) tries to 
estimate the size of the informal sector in the context of a flexible statistical model. 
Typically these models have two components: an equation that specifies the informal 
sector as a latent endogenous variable which is causally related to several factors (such 
as tax burdens, labour market restrictions, efficiency of government institutions), and a 
second equation where the informal sector determines a set of endogenous indicators 
(such as tax evasion, monetized transactions, official labour market participation rates 
etc.) Identification in these models comes from restrictions on structural parameter 
values and the variance covariance matrix of the error terms.  
 
As we discuss in Section 5, in order to produce all-inclusive measures of economic 
activities, national accountants worldwide supplement these standard measurement 
methods with other available data on ‘hidden’ economic activity in various industries, 
most notably data on material use. However, for the purpose of studying the 
determinants of informal activity, macroeconomic models have the advantage of 
                                                 
3 The premise here is that cash is the principal medium of exchange and plays an important role as store 
of value in the informal sector. Arguments to support this premise include the fact that a share of informal 
activities is illegal, and the fact that households who operate in the informal sector have limited access to 
banking services. See Thomas (1992: chapter 7) for a discussion.   5
applying uniform procedures to all countries making cross-country comparisons 
possible.  
 
While estimates of the output and employment size of the informal sector are now 
available for a large cross-section of nations, estimates of the asset size of the informal 
sector (of the fraction of physical capital that is employed in the informal sector, for 
instance) are almost non-existent. One exception is de Soto (2000) who provides rough 
estimates of informal wealth for a few nations. The lack of informal wealth estimates is 
not surprising given the obvious difficulties associated with tracking informal 
investment. Section 5 discusses some of issues associated with measuring assets in the 
informal sector. 
2.3  Size of the informal sector 
All the measurement approaches we have described are based on strong, often 
unverifiable assumptions, and one should therefore focus on results that are not 
sensitive to particular methodological choices. In their survey article, Schneider and 
Enste (2000) list a range of existing estimates of the size of the informal sector for a 
large cross-section of countries. The range of estimates available for each country is 
wide in some cases, but the correlation across estimates obtained from different 
methods is, with a few exceptions, reasonably strong. 
Figure 1: Economic development and informality 
 
Source: Penn World Tables (mark 6.1) and Schneider and Enste (2000). Real GDP per worker is in $US 
chained around 1990. The size of the informal sector is measured using the physical input method for most 
countries, and the currency demand approach for a few countries.  
   6
Figure 1 plots the output size of the informal sector (measured using the physical input 
method) in 1989-90 against real GDP per worker for all countries for which Schneider 
and Enste (2000) provide data. The figure illustrates several well-established facts. Most 
notably, the importance of informal economic activities varies greatly across countries 
and it is highly correlated with the level of economic development. Informal output 
represents 10 to 15 per cent of official GDP in most developed nations, compared to 25 
to 80 per cent in most developing nations. The figure also shows that the size of the 
informal sector varies greatly even among nations at similar stages of economic 
development. This begs a natural question: do nations with large informal sectors share 
distinguishing features other than a typically low level of income per capita? In 
principle, the variance in the importance of informal activities among nations at a 
similar income level could simply be the result of the noise inherent to the methods 
employed to produce those estimates. It turns out however that the size of the informal 
sector is strongly correlated with several country-specific features. 
 
Using a cross section of Latin American countries in the early 1990s, Loayza (1996) 
finds that the size of the informal sector depends positively on proxies for the tax 
burden and labour market restrictions. The size of the informal sector is also negatively 
related to a proxy for the quality of government institutions which reflects the quality of 
bureaucracy, corruption in government and the rule of law. Johnson et al. (1998) obtain 
similar results with a sample of 49 countries that include Latin America, the OECD, and 
the former Soviet Union in the 1990s. They find that the unofficial economy tends to be 
small in countries with a business friendly regulatory regime and a comparatively light 
tax burden. They also find that indices that proxy for the security of property rights and 
the quality of the legal system account for a significant fraction of the cross-country 
variance in the size of the informal sector, and that corruption indices are negatively 
related to the size of the informal sector. Botero et al. (2003) find that heavier regulation 
of labour is associated with a larger unofficial economy in a cross sample of 85 
countries.  
 
These and other studies have uncovered a clear pattern in the cross-country evidence. 
Nations with poorly functioning institutions, a heavy tax burden and high levels of 
corruption tend to have large informal sectors. This constitutes strong evidence in 
favour of models where employers optimally weigh the costs and benefits of operating 
formally. As de Soto (1989) suggests, informality is a natural response to a burdensome 
regulatory environment. As we shall see in Section 3, most modern models of the 
informal sector are founded on this appealing intuition. 
2.4  Formal and informal firms 
Formal and informal firms operate under very different constraints. Most obviously, 
formal employers bear a number of regulatory costs that unregistered firms can typically 
avoid. These costs include licenses, bureaucratic approvals, bribes and other fees. 
De Soto (1989) estimated that setting up a legitimate business in Lima, Peru required a   7
10 month waiting period (estimated to cost over a thousand dollars in lost profits) and 
about US$200 in fees. The same operation took 3.5 hours in Florida and four hours in 
New York (Chickering and Salahdine 1991). Djankov et al. (2002) estimate these costs 
of entry in 85 countries and find that they range from 2.63 per cent of per capita GDP in 
Canada to 463 per cent of per capita GDP in the Dominican Republic.   
 
Perhaps the most important cost borne by producers who choose to enter the formal 
sector is that they become subject to profit and payroll taxes. Tax rates are often set high 
in developing nations since governments are constrained to rely on a very small tax 
base. Other regulations such as environmental and zoning rules and restrictions in the 
use of imported inputs are also important in some countries. Finally, formal producers 
must typically comply with the stipulations of the labour code including minimum wage 
restrictions, severance payments, and social security requirements.  
 
On the other hand, operating legally gives employers better access to public goods such 
as formal contract enforcement mechanisms. It is difficult to enter into enforceable, 
verifiable business arrangements with an economic unit that does not exist legally, does 
not maintain credible accounting practices and often lacks a clear title to the assets it 
owns. Claiming collateral in the event of default is therefore difficult, if not impossible. 
As a result, informal producers must operate with little or no outside finance. For 
instance, using survey data from Lima, Peru, Wendorff (1985) calculates that almost 80 
per cent of the funds used by informal producers (producers who operate below certain 
employment thresholds that vary across sectors) are self-financed and that informal 
(non-bank) sources of finance account for most of the remaining capital. According to 
his calculations, bank loans play a negligible role in informal sector production. 
Furthermore, the loans that informal producers obtain from informal sources are small, 
often granted on a very short-term basis, and carry exorbitant interest rates.4  
 
Not surprisingly then, informal production tends to be much more labour-intensive than 
formal production. Paredes Cruzatt (1987) calculates that half of informally employed 
workers in Lima, Peru, in 1983 operated with less than US$500 worth of capital while 
over 90 per cent of formally employed workers operated with over US$6,000 worth of 
capital. Soderbom and Teal (2000) discuss data from four sub-Saharan African nations5 
that illustrate the heterogeneity in capital intensity across firms in developing countries. 
Their numbers suggest that manufacturing firms with more than 100 employees operate 
on average with three to four times more physical capital per employee than firms with 
fewer than six employees in Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe. 
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finance, and Straub (2005) for a discussion of the role of informal finance in economies with bad 
institutions. 
5 These data were collected by the Centre for the Study of African Economies via surveys between 1992 
and 1998. In these data, the capital stock is the resale value of all structures, equipment and other fixed 
assets as estimated by the respondent in each firm.   8
 
Informal employers also tend to operate on a much smaller scale than formal producers. 
Fortin et al. (1997) report that 90 per cent of all informal jobs (defined as jobs in 
establishments that not legally registered) come from units of production with fewer 
than six employees in Cameroon. In the private formal sector, that fraction is only 31 
per cent. Table 1 illustrates the marked scale difference between formal and informal 
production with data for Buenos Aires and its suburbs drawn from Argentina’s 
permanent household survey between 1993 and 1995. In these calculations, we restrict 
our attention to employees between the ages of 16 and 65 who have exactly one 
occupation. We classify workers as informally employed if they fail to receive social 
security coverage in the form of pension contributions and unemployment insurance, 
two benefits mandated by Argentina’s labour laws.6 As in most developing economies, 
small establishments account for a significantly higher fraction of employment in the 
informal sector than in the formal sector in Argentina.  
Table 1: Individual and job characteristics of formal and informal sector employees: 
Buenos Aires and its suburbs 
 1993  1994  1995 
 Formal  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal 
Establishment size (employees) 
5  or  fewer  0.129 0.598 0.153 0.590 0.145 0.638 
6  to  25  0.278 0.242 0.273 0.265 0.279 0.242 
26  to  50  0.161 0.054 0.148 0.055 0.138 0.030 
51  to  100  0.122 0.043 0.128 0.040 0.133 0.026 
101  to  500  0.175 0.040 0.167 0.030 0.188 0.043 
More  than  501  0.136 0.022 0.131 0.021 0.117 0.020 
Average  age  37.22 33.42 37.00 33.01 37.30 33.22 
Education 
None  0.004 0.006 0.003 0.010 0.003 0.009 
Primary  0.337 0.491 0.324 0.488 0.351 0.485 
High-school 0.429  0.378 0.431 0.389 0.386 0.367 
Superior  0.058 0.033 0.074 0.024 0.077 0.027 
University 0.171  0.093 0.168 0.089 0.183 0.113 
        
Hourly  wages  4.514 3.487 4.750 3.710 4.591 3.360 
Observations  2806 1780 3032 1668 2965 1634 
Source: Argentina’s Permanent Household Survey and Pratap and Quintin (2006). Entries give the fraction 
of employees in each category. Age is measured in years. Hourly wages are in 1993 pesos and corrected 
for Christmas bonuses.  
 
The correlation between scale and formality is so strong that many studies simply 
equate informality with small scale production, a definition that has the virtue of being 
easy to implement, overly simplistic as it may be. This correlation also makes the 
importance of informal activities a natural explanation for the fact that small firms 
account for a much higher fraction of employment in developing nations than they do in 
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industrialized nations—see Tybout (2000) for a discussion. Many authors (see for 
example Rauch 1991; de Soto 1989; Gauthier and Gersovitz 1997) argue that the 
prevalence of small firms in developing nations is a response to the excessive 
regulations and taxes which large firms must bear.  
2.5  Formal and informal workers 
The distribution of employee characteristics also differs greatly across sectors. Among 
other differences, formal workers tend to be more educated, older and earn more than 
their informally employed counterparts as illustrated in Table 1 with data from 
Argentina’s permanent household survey. Given that formal workers tend to have more 
experience and education than other workers, it is not surprising that hourly wages are 
higher in the formal sector than in the informal sector. A question that generates much 
debate is whether observable differences in worker characteristics can account for 
differences in earnings across sectors. The conventional view is that they cannot: formal 
workers, it is often suggested, earn more than observably similar informal sector 
workers. This view is supported by a number of empirical studies that find that some 
earnings-relevant characteristics of workers are better rewarded in the formal sector.7  
 
However, as pointed out by Heckman and Hotz (1986), the fact that parametric 
estimates of earnings functions differ across sectors does not constitute compelling 
evidence that labour markets are segmented along formal/informal lines in developing 
nations. Earnings functions can differ in equilibrium if labour markets are weakly 
competitive, with heterogenous workers choosing the sector where their productivity is 
higher (Rosen 1978).8 Earnings functions may also differ if individual skills are bundled 
(Heckman and Scheinkman 1987). Furthermore, much of the empirical work uses OLS 
techniques which may be biased by the endogeneity of sector choice. Pratap and Quintin 
(2006) show that in addition to constituting a weak test of segmentation, parametric 
evidence that a significant formal sector premium exists may be fragile. Standard tests 
applied to the data summarized in Table 1 suggest that a significant formal premium 
exists in Buenos Aires. But flexible semi-parametric estimation techniques applied to 
the same data yield no evidence that formal workers earn more than their observably 
similar informal counterparts.  
 
Several studies of labour markets in developing nations emphasize the role of trade 
unions—see Alby et al. (2005) for a review of the literature on the effect of unionization 
in African countries. In many nations, particularly in the manufacturing sector, trade 
                                                 
7 See for example Mazumdar (1981) for Malaysia, Heckman and Hotz (1986) for Panama, Roberts 
(1989) for Guadalajara, Mexico, Pradhan and van Soest (1995) for Bolivia, Tansel (1999) for Turkey and 
Gong and van Soest (2001) for Mexico. 
8 This is illustrated by Magnac (1991) who estimates a structural model of earnings and sector choices 
with Columbian data. He finds that earnings functions differ across sectors, but finds no evidence that 
moving across sectors is costly.   10
unions, employers and the government negotiate industry-wide collective bargaining 
agreements which impose legal constraints on earnings and other aspects of labour 
contracts. In practice however, many workers (as a result of improper enforcement or 
the presence of various loopholes) do not receive the protection of unions and the 
dominant view (articulated by Mazumdar 1975) is that these workers must accept 
inferior pay and working conditions. However, while some studies find a positive effect 
of union membership on wages, many others find no such effect. In fact (see Alby et al. 
2005) some studies find that union members tend to earn less than other, observably 
similar workers.9  
 
In summary, the existing evidence on whether labour markets are segmented along 
formal/informal lines in developing nations is mixed, at best. Not coincidentally, many 
recent models of the informal sector do not appeal to any segmentation arguments.  
3 Theories 
This section describes how models of informal economic activities have evolved over 
the years and evaluates the consistency of existing models with the facts we 
documented in Section 2. While we endeavor to mention as many of the many 
important contributions made in this area in the past half-century as possible, our main 
goal is for our literature review to be representative. Thomas (1992) provides a more 
comprehensive review of early work.  
 
The notion that labour markets may be dualistic in developing nations dates back at 
least to the work of Lewis (1954) who expresses the view that the rural sector 
constitutes a stock of potential workers for the urban, formal sector where jobs pay 
higher wages. This view is formalized in the model of Harris and Todaro (1970) where 
urban wages are assumed higher than rural wages. Rural workers who choose to search 
urban jobs run the risk of becoming unemployed. In equilibrium, the mass of workers 
who choose to search is such that expected wages are equated across sectors. Fields 
(1975) expands on the Harris-Todaro model by assuming that urban workers can choose 
to become informally employed rather than search for higher paying formal jobs.  
 
The seminal paper of Rauch (1991) marks the next major break in the modeling of 
informal economic activities. The model builds on Lucas’ (1978) span-of-control model 
in which agents are endowed with different managerial ability levels. Agents can 
operate a strictly concave technology that transforms labour into the consumption good 
either in the formal sector or in the informal sector. Agents who choose to operate 
informally can choose to pay workers below the minimum wage, but they are 
constrained to operate below a certain detection threshold. This formalizes the view 
articulated by de Soto (1989) that producers in developing nations weigh the regulatory 
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costs of operating formally against the benefits, in this case the ability to operate on a 
more efficient scale. This yields a model that is conceptually consistent with the 
correlation between the regulatory burden and the importance of informal activities and 
can replicate many salient aspects of the organization of production in developing 
nations. For instance, it provides an explanation for the fact that firms tend to be either 
very small or very large in those nations (a phenomenon known as the ‘missing middle’ 
in the economic development literature.)  
 
In addition, Rauch’s competitive equilibrium approach is a framework within which one 
can analyze the effects of various public policies on welfare, the tax base and the size of 
the informal sector taking into account general equilibrium effects (see Rauch 1991 for 
instance, for a discussion of the general equilibrium effects of changes in the minimum 
wage on the size of the informal sector.) The computable general equilibrium exercise 
of Fortin et al. (1997) constitutes perhaps the best illustration of the value of Rauch’s 
framework for thinking about the effects of public policy choices.  
 
Rauch (1991) emphasizes the fact that like traditional dualistic models, his model 
predicts that labour markets are segmented along formal/informal lines. Formally 
employed workers earn more than similar workers who are unable to find formal jobs. 
But his framework (together with de Soto’s thought-provoking 1989 monograph) also 
paves the way for a drastic change in the perception of informal activities. In recent 
papers, the informal sector is most often modeled as the optimal, rational response of 
economic units (producers) to government-induced distortions rather than the 
disadvantaged end of dualistic labour markets.  
 
Loayza (1996) illustrates this view by describing a model where labour-market 
segmentation plays no role. Producers can choose to avoid taxation but must then bear 
an exogenous cost of informality. Similarly, Sarte (2000) and Choi and Thum (2005) 
describe environments where the option to operate informally mitigates the distortions 
introduced by a rent-seeking bureaucracy.10 In Dessy and Pallage (2003), the 
productivity differential between the formal and the informal sector depends on the 
amount of taxes levied which makes the emergence of economies with high tax rates 
and large informal sectors endogenous.  
 
Quintin (2000) and Antunes and Cavalcanti (2006) explicitly model the cost of 
informality as the lack of access to contract enforcement and quantify the effects of the 
tax burden and limited enforcement on the size of the informal sector via calibrated 
numerical simulations.11 Straub (2005) studies the impact of limited enforcement on 
informal activities in a model that explicitly considers the role and quality of informal 
                                                 
10 Marcouiller and Young (1995) model the informal sector as a way to avoid ‘exploitation’ by the state. 
11 Antunes and Cavalcanti (2006) also quantify the importance of regulation costs for the size of the 
informal sector.   12
credit mechanisms. Ihrig and Moe (2004) quantify the importance of various aspects of 
tax policy on the size of the informal sector. 
 
Given the lack of compelling evidence that labour markets are segmented along 
formal/informal lines in developing nations, the fact that many recent models of the 
informal sector require no explicit barriers to labour mobility may be welcome 
progress.12 However, an important question to ask is whether those models can replicate 
key features of labour markets in those countries. As documented in the previous 
section, workers employed in the formal sector tend to be more educated, more 
experienced and earn more than informally employed workers. If labour markets are 
integrated, why does the distribution of worker characteristics differ systematically 
across sectors? Amaral and Quintin (2006) propose an answer to this question, which 
we discuss in greater detail in the next section. Because they have limited access to 
outside sources of finance, informal producers may be constrained to substitute 
unskilled labour for physical capital. In other words, segmentation arguments are not 
necessary to account at least qualitatively for salient features of labour markets in 
developing nations.  
 
The theoretical debate over whether a satisfactory model of informal activities should 
assume or imply some wage segmentation has important implications for policy. One 
natural policy response to wage segmentation is to introduce a formal sector wage 
subsidy—see Ray (1997: chapter 10) for a discussion. If labour markets are 
approximately integrated however, such a subsidy could have adverse effects on welfare 
and net tax revenues. If wage differentials across sectors reflect primarily productivity 
differentials, policy that aim solely at reducing the size of the informal sector are likely 
to be a poor substitute (at best) for direct investments in education or investments in the 
quality of formal institutions. Regardless of the outcome of the debate over 
segmentation, modern theories of informal economic activities suggest explanations for 
many salient features of the organization of production in developing countries. We 
make this point formally in the next section. 
4 A  model 
We now outline a simple model that contains many of the ingredients of recent models 
of the informal sector and provides potential explanations for the facts we documented 
in Section 2. 
 
As in Rauch (1991), the model is a general equilibrium model where producers select a 
sector in which to operate given the economy’s institutional features. As in Loayza 
(1996), Sarte (2000), Quintin (2000), Straub (2005) and Amaral and Quintin (2006) 
                                                 
12 Most models continue to assume entry costs into the formal sector for producers to reflect for instance 
the cost of legal registration—see, for instance, Straub (2005).   13
producers who choose to operate formally benefit from better institutions but they bear 
a regulatory cost. Specifically, we assume that contract enforcement is better in the 
formal sector but that formal producers need to pay taxes. This creates a tradeoff 
between access to formal sources of outside financing and the burden of taxation. The 
model, therefore, is consistent with the empirical link between the tax burden, the 
quality of formal institutions and the importance of informal economic activities. 
Clearly, it is also consistent with the fact that finance is scarce in the informal sector.  
 
A key difference between the framework we outline below and many alternative models 
of the informal sector—including the models of Fields (1975) and Rauch (1991)—is the 
fact that labour markets are integrated. Workers can move between sectors at no cost 
and the value of workers’ marginal product is equated across sectors. As we mentioned 
in the previous section, a natural question is whether the model can account for the fact 
that formal workers tend to be more educated and earn more than informal workers 
when labour markets are fully competitive. We will argue that it can under the standard 
assumption that capital and skill are complementary.  
 
Consider then a static economy where agents are endowed with quantity  0 a >  of 
physical capital and a level  0 z >  of managerial ability. We assume that all agents are 
born with the same endowment of capital but that managerial talent varies across agents. 
We also assume that the distribution of managerial ability is continuous. Agents of 
ability  0 z >  can choose to become workers in which case they earn an endogenously 
determined wage w or can instead choose to operate a technology that transforms 
inputs  () ( 0 0 ) kn ,≥, of physical capital and labour into quantity 
kn zk n
αα  of the 
consumption good where  0 kn αα ,>  and  1 nk αα +< .  
 
Managers can self-finance the capital they use in production, but they can also borrow 
some capital from an intermediary that can borrow and lend without bound at 
exogenous rate  0 r > . Assuming that r  is exogenous simplifies this algebra. One can 
motivate this assumption by supposing that the economy under study is small and open 
or, alternatively, that the intermediary has access to a storage technology.  
 
Our key assumption is that the market for loans is imperfect. Specifically, managers 
who borrow some capital can choose to default on the payment they owe the 
intermediary. In the formal sector, default carries a cost equal to fraction  0 η >  of the 
manager’s income while in the informal sector, default carries no cost. This will imply 
that all production is self-financed in the informal sector. These assumptions formalize 
the fact that informal employers have limited access to formal means of contract 
enforcement in a simple fashion.
13 On the other hand, we assume that managers who 
                                                 
13 This contractual framework resembles the one described by Banerjee and Newman (1993). One could 
also generate endogenous borrowing constraints by assuming that informal assets are ‘dead’ in the sense 
of de Soto (2000), that is that they cannot be used as collateral. In fact, any friction that limits informal 
producers’ access to finance should yield results similar to ours.   14
operate in the formal sector must pay fraction τ  of their net income as taxes, while 
informal managers can avoid taxation at no cost.  
 
Given these institutional features, consider an agent of talent  0 z >  who chooses to 
become a manager in the formal sector and let w be the price of labour.
14 Let k  be the 
quantity of capital with which the agent operates and s be the amount she uses as 
collateral for her loan.
15 Then dks =− is the net (uncollateralized) capital they borrow 
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The constraint says that loan contracts must be incentive compatible. The left-hand side 
of the constraint is the end-of period income the manager receives if she chooses to 
honor her debt, while the right-hand side is her income if she defaults. When she 
defaults, she economizes on gross payment ( )(1 ) sd r ++  she owes the intermediary, but 
she loses the accrued value  (1 ) sr +  of her collateral, and fraction η  of her net income 
as default cost. This formulation of the incentive compatibility constraint assumes that 
agents who default in the formal sector must pay taxes. Assuming that agents who 
default on their loan also manage to default on their taxes would not change any of our 
qualitative results. Note that this statement of the problem also assumes that the 
intermediary behaves competitively. Among contracts that are incentive compatible and 
cover the intermediary’s opportunity cost of capital, the contract most favourable to the 
manager prevails. 
 
Solutions to the constrained contracting problem are easy to characterize. Note first that 
given  0 z >  there is a unique scale  ( ) kz
∗  of operation such that the marginal product of 
capital is 1 r + . Absent contractual imperfections (when  1 η = ) all formal agents operate 
at this optimal scale. But when  1 η < , one can show (see Amaral and Quintin 2006) that 
given  0 z >  there exists an asset threshold  ( ) az η τ
∗ ;,  such that agents are constrained if 
                                                 
14 Because we assume no barriers to labour mobility, the price of labour must be the same in the two 
sectors. 
15 Assuming that the intermediary can seize all of the manager’s asset in the event of default would not 
alter the analysis in any way since as we argue below it is optimal for all constrained agents to choose 
sa = .   15
and only if  ( ) aaz η τ
∗ <; , . Furthermore, constrained managers use their entire assets as 
collateral (they set sa = ) since the marginal product of capital exceeds (1 ) r +  in 
constrained establishments. Finally, the loan size rises with managerial talent because 
raising z  weakens the incentive compatibility constraint.  
 
A manager chooses to operate formally when  ( ) ( 0 0) Vz Vz τη ,, ≥ ,,  and agents become 
workers when max{ ( ) ( 0 0)} Vz Vz w τη ,, , ,, < .  In particular, it is agents of low 
managerial ability who choose to become workers. The choice of sector is also 
characterized by a talent threshold. This is because agents of high talent can manage a 
large quantity of resources more effectively hence stand to benefit the most from access 
to outside finance. Formally:
16  
 
Lemma 1: Given w, there exists z  and z  such that agents of ability z  become 
workers if zz < , informal managers if  () zz z ∈,  and formal managers if  (1 ] zz ∈,.  
 
Proof. Assume that z  is such that  () ( 0 0 ) Vz Vz τη ;, = ,, . Then  ( ) akz
∗ <  since otherwise 
the agent has no need for finance and would be better off avoiding taxation. Hence: 
 
1
1 (0 0 ) () ( 1 )
n Vz A wz a a r
α θ − ,, = − + .  
 
In the formal sector on the other hand: 
 
1
1 ( ) (1 )[ ( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))(1 )]
n Vz A wz a dz a dz r
α θ τη τ
− ,, = − + − + +  
 
where  () dz is the intermediary’s net advance.
17  
 
We wish to argue that  11 () ( 0 0 ) Vz Vz τη ;, > ,, . This will imply that  () V τη •; ,  can only 
cross ( 0 0) V •; ,  from below and complete the proof. Inspection of the expressions for 
those two functions and the fact that d  rises with z  shows that  11 () ( 0 0 ) Vz Vz τη ;, > ,,  if 
(1 )( ( )) aa d z
θθ τ <− + . To show that this last condition holds, note that 
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16 The negligible mass of agents whose talent level coincides with one of the thresholds are indifferent 
between two occupations. 
17 Because  () akz
∗ < , one can argue that an optimal contract exists for formal managers of ability z  
such that sa = .   16
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so that (1 ) ( ) dz a ττ −>  since  (1 ) 0 r δ −+ > for constrained managers. Then, 
() ( 0 0 ) Vz Vz τη ;, = ,,  implies (1 )( ( )) ad z a
θθ τ −+ > , as needed.    
 
Optimal policies are then fully described by the two ability thresholds and by the 
maximum incentive compatible loan formal managers can obtain from the intermediary. 
An equilibrium in this environment is a value for the wage rate such that given optimal 
policies the labour market clears. Standard arguments imply that an equilibrium exists 
in this environment.  
 
It should also be clear that the equilibrium informal share of employment, capital and 
output is increasing in the tax rate and/or declining in the quality of contract 
enforcement in the formal sector. When  0 η =  for instance, one easily shows that 
() 0 dz=  for all  0 z ≥  in equilibrium. Since access to finance is the only potential 
benefit associated with opting for the formal sector in this model, all agents choose to 
operate informally when  0 η = . When  1 η =  on the other hand all formal agents are 
unconstrained and the corresponding profit increase can be significant for agents of high 
managerial ability.  
 
The model is thus consistent with the empirical link between the tax burden, 
institutional quality and the size of the informal sector. It also predicts that the 
organization of production should differ across sectors, as our next result states:  
 
Proposition 2: In equilibrium, formal managers employ more capital and workers and 
are more productive in total factor terms than informal managers.  
 
Proof. Lemma 1 implies directly that formal managers are more productive than 
informal managers. In turn, since raising z  weakens the incentive compatibility 
constraint, this implies that formal managers employ more capital than informal 
managers, and that they employ more workers.    
 
Therefore, the model correctly predicts that the informal sector should emphasize small-
scale, self-financed production. One can also show that as long as the enforcement gap 
between the two sectors is large enough, formal managers operate at a higher capital-
labour ratio than informal managers. This yields a possible explanation for the fact that 
the informal sector emphasizes unskilled labour given the well-documented   17
complementarity between skill and physical capital. Because they tend to be more 
borrowing-constrained, informal employers choose to substitute unskilled labour for 
physical capital—see Amaral and Quintin (2006) for a formalization of this idea. In 
other words, despite the fact that labour markets are assumed to be completely 
integrated in our model, the distribution of worker characteristics can differ greatly in 
equilibrium. The model also provides a framework to think about the potential link 
between wealth inequality, output and the importance of informal economic activities. 
A redistribution of wealth towards more talented managers could raise aggregate output 
and consumption by concentrating resources in the hands of the economy’s most 
productive agents. With some ex-post redistribution of income (a challenging prospect, 
admittedly, in economies with poor quality institutions) welfare could increase. 
 
Note however that this redistribution of wealth would have ambiguous effects on the 
size of the informal sector and the tax base. On the one hand, wealthier agents can 
borrow more capital in the formal sector (raising s weakens the incentive-compatibility 
constraint formal managers face) but they also have less of a need for outside finance, 
all else equal. Of course, managerial talent is probably difficult to observe or verify 
which makes talent-based redistribution difficult to implement in practice.18 
 
However, even a wealth-redistribution scheme that is orthogonal to managerial talent 
could have positive effects on output. Indeed, in a version of the model we have 
outlined with exogenous wealth inequality, occupation profiles no longer depend solely 
on talent, they also potentially depend on wealth. Wealthier agents, all else equal, are 
more likely to become managers while more talented but less wealthy agents are forced 
to become workers. Making wealth more equal mitigates this source of inefficiency.
19  
 
While qualitatively promising however, the quantitative impact of wealth redistribution 
schemes could be small. For instance, Quintin (2000) finds that in the context of a 
dynamic general equilibrium version of the model presented here, even drastic wealth 
redistribution schemes do little to alleviate the impact of limited enforcement. Even 
when there is little or no wealth inequality, agents need access to outside sources of 
finance to operate on an efficient scale. Wealth redistribution schemes, therefore, may 
be a poor substitute for dealing directly with obstacles to the process of financial 
intermediation.  
 
The environment we described in this section also suggests that growth naturally brings 
about drastic changes in the organization of production and the importance of informal 
                                                 
18 A practical substitute for talent-based redistribution in this environment is a subsidy to formal 
managers. Because talented managers self-select into the formal sector, more talented managers are more 
likely to take advantage of the subsidy. Another benefit associated with this scheme is that it has a 
positive impact on the tax base.  
19 Naturally and by the same logic, a wealth redistribution scheme that is negatively correlated with talent 
could have adverse effects on output and productivity.   18
activities. Assume that the distribution of managerial productivity shifts to the right over 
time. The equilibrium wage rate (the opportunity cost of self-employment) then rises 
over time, which, under some assumptions on the shape of technological opportunities, 
could lead ever more people to choose to work for others rather than become self-
employed. Therefore we should expect self-employment to fall as an economy 
develops, and the average scale of operation to rise, making access to formal sources of 
finance more valuable. This process is illustrated by Gollin (2000) who also argues that 
this broad pattern of economic development is borne out by the relevant evidence.
20 
Finally, the model’s prediction that formal production is more capital-intensive than 
informal production (a prediction that is borne out by the evidence discussed in 
Section 2) has important implications for the measurement of informal sector assets, an 
issue to which we now turn.  
5  Measuring informal sector assets 
While estimates of the output or employment size of the informal sector exist for a large 
cross-section of nations, estimates of the size of the assets in the informal sector are 
much less common. One important exception is de Soto (2000) whose rough estimates 
of the stock of informal capital confirm the strong belief among development 




De Soto’s estimates are staggering. He calculates for instance that ‘the total value of 
real estate held but not legally owned by the poor’ in developing nations approaches ten 
trillion dollars, which is ‘about twice as much as the total circulating US money supply.’ 
According to de Soto, the stock of informal wealth is many times greater than the stock 
of recorded foreign investment in many nations. de Soto’s estimates are rough, but they 
make it clear that omitting informal assets in wealth measurement exercises could lead 
to highly biased results—see Davies and Shorrocks (2005) for a discussion.  
 
How should one go about measuring informal wealth? Estimates of the output and 
employment size of the informal sector can in principle provide an upper bound for the 
stock of informal capital since all evidence is that informal production is less capital-
intensive than formal production. The resulting upper bound is quite imprecise however 
not only because informal output and employment measures are themselves imprecise, 
but also because the capital intensity of production differs greatly across sectors. 
Because they have very limited access to outside finance, informal producers are 
constrained to substitute labour for capital, a theoretical prediction which is strongly 
borne out by the available evidence.  
                                                 
20 See also Banerjee and Newman (1993). 
21 Woodruff (2001) discusses and questions the quality of de Soto’s estimates. He argues that de Soto 
vastly exaggerates the magnitude of informal assets but acknowledges that even conservative estimates of 
the asset-size of the informal sector are ‘quite large.’   19
 
To illustrate the potential importance of capital-intensity differences across sectors, 
consider an economy where the stock of capital in the informal sector is 
I K  while the 
formal stock of capital is
F K . Similarly, denote informal employment by 
I E  and formal 
employment by
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EE /  is the quotient of 
the capital-employment ratio in the formal sector and the capital-employment ratio in 
the informal sector. In the case of Cameroon for instance, ILO (2003: table 7, section 2) 
reports that unincorporated, unregistered enterprises with 10 employees or fewer 
account for roughly 60 per cent of employment. The data presented by Soderbom and 
Teal (2000) suggest on the other hand that large manufacturing firms are roughly three 
times more capital-intensive than micro firms in Cameroon. Using these numbers as 
approximations for 




EE /  in Cameroon yields an asset share of roughly one 
third. Because informal production is more labour intensive than formal production, the 
informal sector share of the capital stock is noticeably below the informal share of 
output and employment. However, even after large capital-intensity corrections, the 
asset share of the informal sector is likely to remain far from negligible in low income 
nations.  
 
While indicative, indirect calculations along these lines can only yield rough estimates 
of the asset size of the informal sector. Properly accounting for informal wealth requires 
some direct measurement of informal gross fixed capital formation. Standard measures 
of the stock of physical capital use the perpetual inventory method applied to 
investment flows available by broad category in national accounts data. Therefore, 
estimates of the aggregate stock of physical capital reflect the importance of informal 
activities only if informal gross fixed capital formation is properly represented in 
national accounts. To evaluate the extent to which this condition is met, it is important 
to first recognize that, in theory, informal investment is included in gross fixed capital 
formation series. In accordance with 1993 systems of national accounts standards, 
national accountants should include in their calculations activities that are 
‘underground, illegal, informal or undertaken by households for their own final use’. In 
particular, informal does not mean unmeasured. However, given their nature, informal 
activities are measured with significant error and bias.  
 
Macroeconomic models such as those described in Section 2 are one of the primary 
tools national accountants in developing countries use to gauge the importance of 
informal activities. In its handbook devoted to the problem of measuring ‘non-observed’ 
economic activity, the OECD (2002) sharply criticizes this approach. They express a   20
strong preference for the ‘transparent’ use of ‘all available data’ to directly measure 
non-observed activities and encourage national accountants to use data from ‘a variety 
of sources’ on a ‘careful, case-by-case basis … These data are capable of producing 




In practice, national accountants do supplement macroeconomic estimates of the size of 
the informal sector with various ad-hoc techniques. In many nations, non-observed 
gross fixed capital formation is estimated using a commodity flow approach. 
Independent data on material use (with markups designed to approximately correct for 
under-recording where appropriate) and input-output assumptions are used to arrive at 
comprehensive capital formation measures. The goal is to try and correct for the fact 
that establishment surveys (the source of a big part of investment data in most countries) 
are subject to much measurement error. While respondents have no obvious incentive to 
underreport investment, small, young establishments are likely to be under-sampled in 
those surveys. As is well-known, developing nations emphasize small-scale production 
which makes the problem of tracking down small, transient establishments particularly 
acute.  
 
Despite the efforts expended by national accountants, informal sectors clearly add noise 
to available measures of the physical capital stock. Wealth inequality measures based on 
standard methods and data could be overstated because of the likely magnitude of error 
in the measurement of informal production and investment, and because a significant 
part of these activities are not properly taken into account. The only solution to these 
measurement issues is to improve the precision of national accounting practices. Much 
progress has been made in this area over the past decade which bodes well for our 
ability to eventually arrive at better measures of aggregate wealth and worldwide wealth 
inequality. These measurement issues notwithstanding, there is little doubt that a very 
large fraction of wealth is held informally in most developing nations. This, in turn, has 
important consequences for the growth prospects of these nations.  
 
Informal assets are much more difficult to leverage into loans than assets that carry 
proper titles, a fact de Soto (2000) describes as ‘the major stumbling block that keeps 
the rest of the world from benefiting from capitalism’. Because it is difficult for banks 
to enforce the stipulations of loans contracts (which includes the collection of collateral 
in the event of default), lending cannot be supported in the informal sector. According 
to de Soto (2000) the reason why informal assets are not treated as proper collateral for 
loans is that property rights over these assets are not clearly defined and legally 
recorded. As a result, informal assets are ‘dead capital’ because ‘they cannot be turned 
                                                 
22 The strong preference on the part of economists for macro-models is easy to understand however. A 
unified methodology is necessary for cross-country comparisons. The use of macro estimates does not 
pre-suppose the understanding of ‘case-by-case’ procedure choices made by national accountants at all 
stages of the data collection process.   21
into capital, cannot be traded outside of narrow local circles where people know and 
trust each other, cannot be used as collateral for a loan, and cannot be used as a share 
against and investment’. The most obvious implication of these observations is that 
titling programs have the potential to unleash vast amounts of under-utilized resources 
in developing nations by allowing households to pursue previously untapped investment 
opportunities.  
 
Yet, as Woodruff (2001) points out, titling programs have produced disappointing 
results in many cases. Woodruff views this as evidence that titling programs can only be 
successful as part of a broad set of reforms designed to improve the functioning of 
institutions. Quite obviously, a better definition of property rights, in and of itself, is not 
likely to have much impact in nations where formal means of contract enforcement are 
weak. The broad challenge is to create an institutional environment where informal 
assets, both physical and human, can be directed to their most productive use.  
6 Conclusion 
Research on the nature, determinants and consequences of informal activities in 
developing nations has yielded a number of important insights. Among other empirical 
regularities, the importance of informal activities is highly correlated with a nation’s 
level of economic development and the quality of its institutions. Furthermore, the 
informal sector emphasizes small-scale, unskilled-labour intensive, self-financed 
activities. Modern models of the informal sectors are consistent with these facts and 
provide natural frameworks for evaluating the potential consequences of pro-growth 
policies in nations with large informal sectors.
23  
 
For instance, competition-enhancing reforms and efforts to reduce the burden of 
regulation can have a big impact on the size of the formal sector as the economy adjusts 
to these institutional changes and resources move across sectors. The welfare 
consequences of these shocks to formal employment depend in part on the degree of 
integration between the formal and the informal labour market. If the informal sector is 
best viewed as the disadvantaged end of dualistic labour markets, transitional or 
permanent reductions in formal employment could induce large welfare losses. On the 
other hand, precisely because it absorbs some of the cyclical and transitional variations 
in formal employment, the informal sector may in fact help mitigate the short-run 
impact of reforms.
24  
                                                 
23 The impact of a variety of reforms on the importance of informal activities and on poverty was the 
object of a 2004 conference organized by the World Institute for Development Economics Research. A 
summary of the conference proceedings is available at: http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-
2004-2/conference2004-2.htm. 
24 Similarly, recessions triggered for instance by financial crises in emerging nations lead to very large 
swings in the informal share of employment. This is evidence that workers accept lower paying jobs 
during downturns, but this also illustrates the key buffer role informal employment plays in those 
economies.   22
 
Generally speaking, dualistic models provide a rationale for policies that aim directly at 
shifting more resources to the formal sector. If marginal products are not equated across 
sectors, increasing formal employment can reduce poverty and increase welfare. If, on 
the other hand, income differences across sectors reflect productivity differences and the 
two labour markets are well integrated, policies whose sole objective is to boost formal 
employment are unlikely to yield large welfare gains. In those models, reducing poverty 
requires investments in human capital, and broad pro-growth policies are more likely to 
benefit all workers. In summary, how best to model informal activities is not merely an 
academic question. It has important consequences for how best to design efforts to 
alleviate poverty in developing economies.  
 
One area where much work remains to be done is the measurement of informal wealth. 
Estimates of the asset size of the informal sector are rare and imprecise when they exist. 
A satisfactory analysis of wealth inequality across households and across countries 
demands better data.  
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